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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 12-3255 
 ___________ 
 
 JAMES BRAWNER, III, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
EDUCATION MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, et al.; 
ART INSTITUTE OF PHILADELPHIA, et al.; 
CONGRESSMAN CHAKA FATTAH; 
PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION; 
ACICS; ACCST; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 2:11-cv-06131) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Joel H. Slomsky 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
  January 3, 2013 
 
 Before:  AMBRO, HARDIMAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed : February 13, 2013) 
_________________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________________ 
PER CURIAM 
 In September 2011, appellant James Brawner filed a lawsuit based on his 
unsatisfactory experience with the Art Institute of Philadelphia, which he attended in the 
2 
 
late 1990s and sporadically thereafter.  He named federal, state, and private defendants, 
and alleged fraud, negligence, and breach of contract.  The District Court dismissed his 
claims against the governmental defendants for lack of jurisdiction and dismissed his 
claims against the private defendants as barred by the statute of limitations.  See 
generally Brawner v. Educ. Mgmt. Corp., No. 11–6131, 2012 WL 3064019 (E.D. Pa. 
July 27, 2012).  Brawner appeals only the dismissal of his claims against the private 
defendants and has expressly abandoned his claims against the federal and state 
defendants.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
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 “State tolling principles „are generally to be used by a federal court when it is 
                                                 
1
 The parties, who are our primary audience, are familiar with the facts of this case, so we 
will not engage in a protracted recitation.   
 
The District Court arguably had jurisdiction over Brawner‟s claims against the federal 
defendants under the Federal Tort Claims Act.  See 28 U.S.C § 1346(b).  We need not 
determine whether the District Court properly exercised supplemental jurisdiction over 
his claims against the private defendants because none of the parties has raised the issue 
either here or below.  See Acri v. Varian Assocs., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997) (en 
banc). 
 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “[T]he law of this Circuit (the so-called 
„Third Circuit Rule‟) permits a limitations defense to be raised by a motion under Rule 
12(b)(6), but only if the time alleged in the statement of a claim shows that the cause of 
action has not been brought within the statute of limitations.”  Robinson v. Johnson, 313 
F.3d 128, 135 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotations marks omitted) (quoting Hanna v. U.S. 
Veterans‟ Admin. Hosp., 514 F.2d 1092, 1094 (3d Cir. 1975)).  Our review of a 
limitations-based dismissal is plenary, and we may affirm on any basis supported by the 
record.  Glover v. FDIC, 698 F.3d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Lake v. Arnold, 232 
F.3d 360, 365–66 (3d Cir. 2000); Guthrie v. Lady Jane Collieries, Inc., 722 F.2d 1141, 
1145 n.1 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245 (1937); Behring 
Int‟l, Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, 699 F.2d 657, 666 n.7 (3d Cir. 1983)).    
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applying a state limitations period;‟ therefore, we look to Pennsylvania law, predicting 
how the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would resolve the statute of limitations issue.”  
Knopick v. Connelly, 639 F.3d 600, 606 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Debiec v. Cabot Corp., 
352 F.3d 117, 128 (3d Cir. 2003) and citing Jewelcor Inc. v. Karfunkel, 517 F.3d 672, 
676 n.4 (3d Cir. 2008)).  In Pennsylvania, the limitations periods for fraud, negligence, 
and breach of contract claims are two years, two years, and four years, respectively.  42 
Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 5524(7), 5525(a); see also Ash v. Cont‟l Ins. Co., 932 A.2d 877, 879–
80 (Pa. 2007).  “Generally, a statute of limitations period begins to run when a cause of 
action accrues; i.e., when an injury is inflicted and the corresponding right to institute a 
suit for damages arises.”  Gleason v. Borough of Moosic, 15 A.3d 479, 484 (Pa. 2011).  
When properly invoked, however, the “discovery rule” acts “as an exception to this 
principle, and provides that where the complaining party is reasonably unaware that his 
or her injury has been caused by another party‟s conduct, the discovery rule suspends, or 
tolls, the running of the statute of limitations.”  Id.  “Where . . . reasonable minds would 
not differ in finding that a party knew or should have known on the exercise of 
reasonable diligence of his injury and its cause, the court determines that the discovery 
rule does not apply as a matter of law.”  Fine v. Checcio, 870 A.2d 850, 858–59 (Pa. 
2005); accord Coregis Ins. Co. v. Baratta & Fenerty, Ltd., 264 F.3d 302, 307 (3d Cir. 
2001) (quoting Sadtler v. Jackson-Cross Co., 587 A.2d 727, 732 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991)).   
 We agree with the District Court that no reasonable factfinder could conclude that 
Brawner filed within the limitations period.  As discussed above, Brawner‟s primary 
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interaction with the defendants occurred in the late 1990s; the latest actual transaction he 
appears to describe occurred in 2005, well outside of the limitations periods for a suit 
filed in 2011.  Brawner insists that the limitations period was tolled until the 2011 
“discovery” of the alleged fraud and breach of contract, but this is belied by his 
knowledge that something was amiss long before 2011; moreover, he makes no showing 
that the information retrieved in 2011 was essential to the commencement of a suit.  As 
demonstrated by his complaint and other filings, he knew he was injured and made 
repeated inquiries of the various defendants, yet was apparently content to allow multiple 
years to pass between letters and responses.  That he may not have been aware of the 
“full extent” of the possible injury, see Gleason, 15 A.3d at 484, does not save his claims; 
“a cause of action accrues, and thus the applicable limitations period begins to run, when 
an injury is inflicted,” Wilson v. El-Daief, 964 A.2d 354, 361 (Pa. 2009), and 
“knowledge of every fact necessary to prevail on the claim is not required to . . . trigger 
the accrual period,” Epstein v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 460 F.3d 183, 188 (1st Cir. 2006) 
(emphasis added and quotation marks omitted) (applying Massachusetts discovery rule).
2
     
Brawner does not present any other reason why the limitations period should have 
been tolled during the intervening years.  While he invokes his pursuit of “administrative 
remedies,” he does not explain how an administrative process would have tolled the 
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 Indeed, Brawner likely could have obtained these documents, to the extent that they 
were relevant, through the civil litigation discovery process after commencing a timely 
suit. 
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limitations period on the state common-law claims that remain.  Cf. Uber v. Slippery 
Rock Univ. of Pa., 887 A.2d 362, 367 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005) (pursuit of “an employer‟s 
internal administrative proceeding is not sufficient to toll the statute of limitations for 
filing a PHRA complaint” in Pennsylvania). 
 In sum, we agree with the District Court that the limitations period has run for the 
claims that Brawner now appeals.
3
  We will therefore affirm the court‟s judgment. 
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 Although Brawner explicitly disclaims his desire to appeal the other grounds for relief 
he raised below, we have reviewed them and find them to fail for substantially the same 
reasons discussed by the District Court. 
